読売新聞

読売新聞 (Yomiuri Shimbun) Censorship in China and North Korea

What 読売新聞 Is

読売新聞 (Yomiuri Shimbun) launched in 1874 and is Japan's largest newspaper by circulation, currently owned by the Yomiuri Shimbun Holdings Company. It maintains a print circulation exceeding 7 million copies and operates a significant digital presence through its website and mobile applications. The publication serves a primarily Japanese-language audience but has grown its English-language content offerings in recent years. Its editorial coverage spans domestic politics, international affairs, economics, and culture, with editorial positions generally characterized as centrist to center-right.

Why It's Censored

In China, 読売新聞's digital properties face systematic blocking under the framework of regulations administered by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). The publication's coverage of Taiwan, Hong Kong political developments, and human rights issues conflicts directly with Chinese Communist Party editorial guidelines. Content addressing the Uyghur situation, Tibet autonomy disputes, and criticism of Chinese government policies triggers automated filtering mechanisms. The Chinese government does not publish explicit block lists; the censorship operates through opaque administrative directives rather than named legislation.

North Korea maintains near-total information control through the Korean Central News Agency monopoly and implements comprehensive DNS and IP-level blocking of foreign news sources. 読売新聞 is blocked not for specific content but because all independent foreign journalism contradicts the regime's information control apparatus. The North Korean government has no formal censorship laws; instead, blocking is executed through the Kwangmyong intranet system and international gateway restrictions managed by state telecommunications authorities.

Technical Blocking Methods

China employs multiple layered techniques. DNS filtering at the resolver level redirects requests for yomiuri.co.jp to null routes or Chinese government servers. SNI (Server Name Indication) inspection on the Great Firewall identifies HTTPS traffic destined for blocked domains and terminates connections before the TLS handshake completes. Deep packet inspection identifies traffic patterns associated with news sites even when domain names are obscured. IP-based blocking supplements these methods, though less consistently applied to shared CDN infrastructure.

North Korea uses simpler but more absolute methods: complete IP range blocking at the national gateway and DNS resolution failures returning no valid addresses. The Kwangmyong intranet system operates as an isolated alternative network that permits no external traffic without explicit regime authorization.

User Workarounds

Users in China with technical knowledge typically use circumvention tools that encrypt traffic at the application layer, preventing both DNS and SNI inspection from identifying the destination. Proxying through servers outside China's national borders bypasses IP-based filtering, though such traffic itself may be detected and throttled. Accessing cached or archived versions through third-party services sometimes succeeds when the primary domain is blocked.

North Korea presents nearly insurmountable barriers for ordinary citizens. International access remains restricted to government officials and select technicians. Defectors and external researchers access Yomiuri content through standard international networks.

Alternatives

Asahi Shimbun (asahi.com) and Mainichi Shimbun face similar blocking in China but slightly less consistent filtering, likely due to lower international profile. Both are also blocked in North Korea. NHK World (nhk.or.jp/world) operates government-funded international service with English content and experiences equivalent censorship in China, though its state broadcaster status provides no protection.

Outlook

China's censorship of foreign news sources is intensifying rather than easing. The CAC has increased blocking consistency since 2020 and added SNI filtering capabilities. North Korea shows no indicators of liberalizing information access. Neither country demonstrates policy movement toward reduced news censorship. Long-term trajectory points toward tighter rather than looser restrictions.