Be

Be App Censorship in China and North Korea: Technical Blocks and Workarounds

What Be Is

Be is a ride-hailing and mobility platform launched in Vietnam, operated by Be Group (a subsidiary of Phuc Khang Corporation). The service offers ride-hailing, bike-sharing, and delivery services across Southeast Asia, with primary user concentration in Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand. Since its 2019 launch, Be has positioned itself as a domestic alternative to Grab and Go-Jek in regional markets.

Why Be Is Censored

Be faces active restriction in China and North Korea, but for markedly different reasons.

In China, Be's blockade stems from state control over ride-hailing infrastructure. China's Ministry of Transport and cyberspace authorities (CAC) enforce strict localization rules: foreign and Vietnamese-origin mobility apps must either operate through state-approved partnerships or face network-level blocking. Be lacks such partnership status. Additionally, cross-border data flows—inherent to Be's operations—violate provisions in the Cybersecurity Law (2016) and the Data Security Law (2021), which mandate domestic data residency for services touching Chinese users or adjacent markets. The app is treated as an "illegal foreign service" under these statutes.

In North Korea, Be's restriction is categorical rather than regulatory. The country permits no foreign commercial applications unless explicitly authorized by state bodies. Be has no such authorization. Given North Korea's closed internet architecture (access limited to elite government users and tourists on isolated networks), the block is less about technical enforcement and more about absolute prohibition.

Technical Blocking Methods

China employs multiple overlapping techniques:

Domain Name System (DNS) filtering is the first layer. Be's domain registrations and associated subdomains are poisoned in state-controlled DNS resolvers, returning null responses or redirects to government portals. This is managed by the DNS filtering infrastructure under CAC oversight.

Internet Protocol (IP) blocking follows. Be's known application servers and API endpoints face stateful packet filtering at the border gateway switches operated by China's three major ISPs. Connections to these IPs are dropped or rate-limited to unusability.

Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) targets HTTPS traffic. CAC-managed DPI systems analyze TLS handshakes and hostname data (via SNI leakage) to identify Be clients, then reset connections. This is particularly effective against mobile app traffic, which exhibits consistent fingerprints.

In North Korea, blocking is simpler: wholesale IP filtering combined with the fundamental lack of public internet access means the question is largely academic. Citizens with any internet access use state-approved networks.

User Workarounds

Knowledgeable users in China employ several tactics. Routing traffic through encrypted tunnels that obscure SNI and encrypt DNS queries bypasses DNS and DPI identification. Proxy services that terminate in jurisdictions outside China's enforcement perimeter (Southeast Asia, Hong Kong pre-2020) can restore access, though latency and reliability vary. Some users exploit corporate or educational VPN infrastructure, which operates under different regulatory scrutiny than consumer services.

In North Korea, workarounds are theoretical; access to foreign applications is not a practical concern for the general population.

Alternatives

Grab (Malaysia, launched 2012) operates across Southeast Asia but faces similar DNS/IP blocking in China, though less aggressive than Be due to regional partnerships. Go-Jek (Indonesia, 2010) is also blocked in China but maintains some operational continuity through Indonesian regulatory exemptions. Didi Chuxing, the Chinese state-aligned ride-hailing monopoly, faces no domestic restriction and is recommended for users within China seeking compliant alternatives.

Outlook

Be's access restrictions in China are tightening, not easing. Each regulatory cycle (Data Security Law amendments, CAC enforcement) adds layers of technical blocking. North Korea's blockade is stable and absolute. For Be users in affected regions, long-term access via current workarounds is uncertain.