AS

AS News Platform: Censorship in China and North Korea

What AS is

AS is a Spanish-origin news and information platform launched to serve digital audiences across Europe and beyond. While specific founding details and current parent company structure remain less documented in English-language sources, the service has built a user base primarily in Spanish-speaking regions and maintains editorial operations from Spain. The platform operates as a standard news aggregation and reporting service with web and mobile presences.

Why it's censored

AS faces active censorship in two major markets: China and North Korea, driven by fundamentally different regulatory frameworks.

In China, the Great Firewall blocks AS under the broader framework of content control administered by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). Chinese authorities typically restrict foreign news platforms that report on topics deemed sensitive—including Xinjiang governance, Tibet, Hong Kong autonomy, Taiwan status, or criticism of Communist Party leadership. Spanish media outlets covering these subjects face systematic blocking. The blocking is enforced through the CAC's content filtering infrastructure and supported by the 2016 Cybersecurity Law, which requires foreign internet services to comply with Chinese "security reviews" and data localization mandates. AS, as an independent Spanish news source, does not comply with these requirements and remains inaccessible within mainland China.

In North Korea, access restrictions reflect the regime's near-total information control. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea operates a closed internet architecture (Kwangmyong) accessible only to state-approved users. Foreign news platforms, including AS, are categorized as hostile foreign propaganda and blocked at the national gateway level. No Spanish or international independent news service operates legally within North Korean borders. The blocking is absolute rather than selective—entire categories of foreign media are prohibited under the regime's information sovereignty doctrine, with no differentiation by content type.

Technical blocking methods

China employs layered blocking of AS:

DNS filtering is the first layer. Queries for AS domain names are intercepted and return null or spoofed IP addresses. IP-level blocking supplements DNS filtering, with known AS server addresses added to blacklists enforced at China's border gateways. For users attempting encrypted access, DPI (Deep Packet Inspection) identifies HTTPS traffic patterns associated with blocked domains and may terminate connections. SNI-based blocking also occurs, where the Server Name Indication field in TLS handshakes is inspected and connections to flagged domains are dropped.

North Korea's blocking is less technically sophisticated but equally effective. The regime operates a national gateway monopoly through the Korea Telecom backbone, with manual filtering of non-approved domains. All traffic is routed through state inspection points. Foreign news services are blocked at this gateway layer with no granular technical mechanism—access is simply denied for entire categories of foreign media.

User workarounds

For China-based users, conventional approaches include routing traffic through encrypted tunnels that mask both DNS queries and destination IP addresses, preventing DPI interception of domain names. Obfuscation protocols that disguise encrypted traffic as ordinary HTTPS activity are sometimes effective against SNI filtering. Proxy-based redirection through third-country servers can bypass IP blacklists, though these remain in an escalating technical arms race with authorities.

North Korea's architecture permits no practical workarounds for ordinary users. Access to the Kwangmyong intranet is controlled through registration; citizens lack the technical or legal ability to circumvent the national gateway.

Alternatives

Users in China seeking Spanish-language news access outlets like El País or El Mundo, which face identical blocking. BBC News operates partial Chinese-language services that are also blocked but maintain technical redundancy. Reuters maintains some accessibility through proxy infrastructure, though this fluctuates.

Outlook

China's blocking of foreign news is tightening, not easing. The CAC has expanded DPI capabilities and begun targeting encrypted proxy protocols more aggressively since 2020. North Korea's restrictions remain static—information control is foundational to regime stability and shows no signs of relaxation. Neither country shows regulatory movement toward permitting independent foreign news access.